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ABSTRACT: What can features of  cognitive architecture, e.g. the information encapsulation of  certain 
emotion processing systems, tell us about emotional rationality? de Sousa proposes the following 
hypothesis: “the role of  emotions is to supply the insufficiency of  reason by imitating the encapsulation 
of  perceptual modes” (de Sousa 1987: 195). Very roughly, emotion processing can sometimes occur in a 
way that is insensitive to what an agent already knows, and such processing can assist reasoning by 
restricting the response-options she considers. This paper aims to provide an exposition and assessment 
of  de Sousa’s hypothesis. I argue information encapsulation is not essential to emotion-driven reasoning, 
as emotions can determine the relevance of  response-options even without being encapsulated. 
However, I argue encapsulation can still play a role in assisting reasoning by restricting response-options 
more efficiently, and in a way that ensures which options emotions deem relevant are not overridden by 
what the agent knows. I end by briefly explaining why this very feature also helps explain how emotions 
can, on occasion, hinder reasoning.  
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1. Introduction  
The last few decades of  emotion research in philosophy, and to an extent in cognitive psychology, has 
involved a full-blown assault on what Solomon dubs the “The Myth of  the Passions”: the treatment of  
emotions “as irrational forces beyond our control, disruptive and stupid, unthinking and counter-
productive, against our “better interests”, and often ridiculous” (1977: 106). Emotions, it has been 
argued, and with some qualifications empirically demonstrated, play a role in reasoning, aid us in action, 
are to a certain extent under our control, and exhibit intentionality. These factors, especially the role 
emotions play in reasoning, are also said to make them, contra orthodoxy, rational. Or more carefully, 
emotions are things that can contribute, in a positive way, to whether their bearers are rational. 
 One way of  arguing for this conclusion draws on the cognitive architecture of  the mind. That is 
to say they concern ways of  carving up cognitive processing theorised by cognitive science, and have 
their roots in computational theories of  the mind. Such accounts are interesting in two respects. First, 
ways of  modelling cognitive architecture in cognitive science tend to be both empirically informed and 
empirically tractable; they make claims about ways of  carving up cognitive processing that, at least in 
theory, can be empirically tested. What is to be gained by such accounts, therefore, are empirically-
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* An abridged version of  this paper is to appear in L. Candiotto (ed.), The Value of  Emotions 
for Knowledge. Palgrave Macmillan.
driven descriptions of  the precise way emotions assist reasoning, which can in turn confirm or 
disconfirm our initial a priori speculations about emotional rationality. Second, and relatedly, if  cognitive 
architecture has a bearing on emotional rationality, we can’t expect to have a complete account of  
emotional rationality simply by armchair theorising because how cognitive processing is actually 
structured will turn out to be an empirical issue.  
 These features make an investigation into an account of  emotional rationality grounded in 
cognitive science philosophically pressing. But they do so only on the proviso that cognitive 
architecture actually has a bearing on emotional rationality. A possible way it does is hypothesised by de 
Sousa (1987). This hypothesis draws directly on a key concept of  cognitive science, viz. information 
encapsulation. Very roughly, a system is informationally encapsulated if  the function it computes is 
insensitive to information stored in other systems, especially systems which encode high-level 
representations like beliefs and desires. Fodor (1983) takes information encapsulation to be the 
“essence” of  modularity, and argues most mental activity besides central cognition, e.g. perceptual 
processing, language processing and motor-control, are informationally encapsulated. For instance, he 
argues visual processing is modular given that visual illusions, like the muller-lyre illusion, persist despite 
our explicit knowledge to the contrary. In the muller-lyre illusion, we continue to see the lines as being 
of  different lengths even when we come to discover that they are actually of  the same length.  
 de Sousa’s hypothesis is this: “the role of  emotions is to supply the insufficiency of  reason by 
imitating the encapsulation of  perceptual modes” (1987: 195).  The idea, briefly, is when we consider a 
response-option to a given situation, reason alone can’t determine which information is relevant from 
the vast store of  information which the agent knows, as assessing whether each piece of  information is 
relevant would be too cognitively demanding. Emotions assist reasoning by pre-highlighting certain 
pieces of  information as relevant or “salient”. This is achieved by emotions “mimicking” the 
information encapsulation of  perception, i.e. by emotion processing being temporarily insensitive to 
information stored outside certain channels, e.g. channels to do with belief.  
 This hypothesis can be challenged on two fronts. First, on whether emotion processing can be 
informationally encapsulated, even temporally. Second, assuming it can be, on whether it can still, 
nevertheless, play the role de Sousa ascribes to it in emotion-driven reasoning. As it stands, there is 
empirical evidence to suggest that emotional processing can, sometimes, be informationally 
encapsulated. That is, multi-pathway models of  emotional processing are confirmed at a 
neurobiological level, where some emotion processing is found to occur “off-line” without considering 
what the agent already knows.  A careful examination of  the second challenge, however, has not been 1
taken up. This paper aims to make up for this neglect by addressing the question, What can information 
encapsulation tell us about emotion-driven reasoning? In other words, What can information 
encapsulation tell us about emotional rationality? 
 Multi-level theories of  emotion processing have been proposed by Leventhal (1979), Barnard (1985), LeDoux 1
(1996), amongst others.  See Teasdale (1999) for a review.
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 In what follows, I provide an exposition of  de Sousa’s hypothesis, and then explain why it is 
misleading. In particular, I argue information encapsulation is not essential for emotion-driven 
reasoning, as emotions can fulfil their role of  highlighting certain pieces of  information as salient 
without being informationally encapsulated (§2). However, I argue information encapsulation still 
proves relevant for emotional-driven reasoning in that it ensures (i) emotions can fulfil this role in an 
efficient manner, and (ii) the fulfilment of  this role won’t, insofar as emotions are encapsulated, be 
overridden by what the agent knows (§3). I end by briefly explaining why this very feature also helps 
explain how emotions can, on occasion, hinder reasoning (§4). 
2.    How Emotions Assist Reasoning 
What can information encapsulation tell us about emotional rationality? de Sousa, as a matter of  fact, 
provides six principles of  rationality, each of  which lends itself  to an independent account of  how 
emotions can be rational. The account of  rationality that has a bearing on our question, however, only 
concerns his principle of  strategic rationality. Rationality, it is assumed here, is a teleological concept: 
anything can be rational to the extent that it fulfils its function. The function of  emotion, broadly 
speaking, is to guide us in reasoning. But more specifically, their biological function is to do something 
reason can’t, viz. to determine the salience of  features of  perception and reasoning. The information 
encapsulation of  emotions on this picture bears on emotional rationality in that it plays a role in how 
emotions fulfil this function.  
 An exposition of  this picture is provided in the context of  how emotions can help solve what 
de Sousa calls “the philosophers’ frame problem”: 
[W]e need to know when not to retrieve some irrelevant information from the vast store of  which we 
are possessed. But how do we know it is irrelevant unless we have already retrieved it? I proffer a very 
general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by this predicament 
by controlling the salience of  features of  perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the 
information encapsulation of  perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options (de 
Sousa 1987: 172). 
Before unpacking this picture, it is worth stressing that the original frame problem has its roots in 
artificial intelligence. This problem has been taken up and formulated in several distinct ways , all of  2
which, though related, arguably only bear a loose resemblance to the problem identified above. Evans 
(2002), for instance, goes so far as to say that de Sousa’s discussion of  the above problem qua frame 
problem is a red herring. In order to avoid muddying the waters, the scope of  this paper will be 
 Chow (2013), for instance, discusses six different versions of  the frame problem.2
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restricted to the philosophers’ frame problem, i.e. the one outlined above, as opposed to the plethora of  
related problems discussed under the umbrella of  “the frame problem”. 
 Even with our scope restricted in this way, the problem, as well as the proposed solution to it, 
still requires interpretation along several distinct lines; some of  which will turn out to be relevant to an 
exposition of  the role emotions play in assisting reasoning broadly construed, and others more specific 
to how their encapsulation enables them to play this role. I begin by discussing interpretations along the 
first of  these lines.  
 The problem, in its broadest form, is a problem about how to restrict the amount of  
information to be computed for us to get an appropriate response-option. de Sousa himself  takes it as 
a constraint of  the problem that we not only strict the amount of  information, but that we are also able 
restrict information to those that are relevant or salient: “No logic determines salience: what to notice, 
what to attend to, what to inquire about” (1987: 191).  It is here that emotions come in by fulfilling 3
their biological function of  determining salience. But why pure reason alone can't determine salience 
isn't entirely clear. Spelling this out is crucial for getting clear on the precise role information 
encapsulation is supposed to contribute to this picture. 
 There appears to be at least three factors relevant to why pure reason can't tell us which 
response-option to consider, and thereby giving rise to the philosophers’s frame problem. de Sousa 
himself  sometimes talks as if  the information that needs to be restricted is that which the organism 
already knows, i.e. how we determine what’s relevant “from the vast store of  which we are 
possessed” (pg. 172). He elaborates, “The frame problem arises only when we consider what to do with 
information interpreted and stored in an intentional system” (pg. 195). If  the information we need to 
determine as salient is information the agent already knows, there are two possibilities as to why reason 
alone can't determine which information is relevant. First, it would simply be too cognitively 
demanding to individually figure out whether each piece of  information is relevant; and that remains so 
even if  we only consider those sub-personally available to the agent. Second, even if  such a task were 
cognitively possible, it remains unclear whether reason alone can determine which pieces of  
information are relevant under the time-constraints required to respond to certain situations.  
 To elaborate, some discussions of  the frame problem build in a time-constraint to determining 
which pieces of  information are relevant. For example, in Dennett (1984) we find the tale of  a robot 
who when faced with a ticking bomb whiles away precious time considering everything it knows. This 
constraint is not explicit in de Sousa’s version of  the problem, but it stands to reason that some real-life 
cases will come with significant time-constraints, e.g. figuring out the best response-option when faced 
with a mugger. Fodor (1987: 26) calls this “Hamlet’s problem: How to tell when to stop thinking”. If  
reason can only determine which information is relevant by considering each piece of  information 
individually, reason alone can’t determine which pieces are relevant under such time-constraints, i.e. 
 de Sousa’s (pg. 194) exposition of  why the frame problem isn’t the problem of  induction also makes explicit 3
that the frame problem he has in mind is one concerning which information is relevant. 
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except sometimes by random. So here we have another factor that explains why reasoning alone can't 
solve the philosophers’s frame problem, at least when we consider real-life instances of  where the 
problems arise. 
 Now consider a different way of  interpreting the information that needs to be restricted. This 
stems from a related, though, distinct formulation of  the philosophers’ frame problem: “Assume all the 
powers already listed — logic, induction, and more-than-encyclopaedic knowledge: the philosophers’ frame 
problem, roughly, is how we make use of  just what we need from this vast store, how not to retrieve 
what we don’t need” (de Sousa pg. 193). On this way of  understanding what is at issue, the problem is 
not just how to restrict propositional knowledge the agent already knows, but also all the inferences 
they can draw, and all the response-options they can consider. (So more accurately, the situation is such 
that we need to not just restrict the information over which to compute, but the computations 
themselves as well). Reason alone can’t restrict information thus construed because of  the two 
aforementioned factors. It would simply be too cognitively demanding to draw each inference before 
assessing whether it is relevant, not to mention this would take an unrealistically long amount of  time. 
de Sousa himself  considers the inferences drawn to be “from a potential infinity” (pg. 195). If  this 
turns out to be the case, even setting aside the previous two factors, it would be straight out impossible 
for reason to determine which inferences, from a set of  infinity, are relevant to a given response-option. 
This is the third factor that accounts for why reason alone can’t determine salience. 
 The above discussion is telling not only because it helps us get clear on exactly what gives rise 
to the philosophers’ frame problem, but because this in turn lets us see more clearly what is required to 
solve it. The role of  emotions, recall, is to supply insufficiency of  reason. For de Sousa, this is achieved 
by emotions mimicking the information encapsulation of  perception. What the above ways of  
understanding the factors which give rise to the philosophers’ frame problem bring out, however, is if  
information encapsulation is relevant to solving the problem, it is relevant only to the extent that it 
helps determine the salience of  information. This is because on this picture, the role of  emotions, in 
essence, is to supply the insufficiency of  reason by determining the salience of  information.  
 So how exactly do emotions determine which pieces of  information are relevant? On certain 
ways of  understanding emotions, it is in their very nature that they determine the salience of  patterns 
of  perception and reasoning — and crucially, they do so regardless of  whether emotion processing is 
sometimes informationally encapsulated. There are two features, ones we uncontroversially ascribe to 
emotions, which work in conjunction to explain how they determine salience. First, emotions have an 
affective component, and the types of  affective components they do have marks them out as having a 
valence. The idea, very roughly, is emotions feel good or bad; they appear positive or negative.  Second, 4
emotions are not only representational, but they have an evaluative component: they assign a positive or 
 See Colombetti (2005), Prinz (2010) and Carruthers (2017) for overviews of  emotional valence.4
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negative value to their intentional objects, i.e. what they are about or in response to.  The fact that 5
emotions have an affective component with a valence explains why their representational component is 
evaluative. In brief, emotions feel good or bad, and in virtue of  that, their intentional objects are 
represented as also being good or bad; as being positive or negative. This helps explain why emotions 
bias certain pieces of  information over others. We are drawn to pieces of  information represented as 
positive or negative whilst neglecting ones that aren’t represented in either of  these ways. 
 Crucially, emotions can determine the salience of  information whether or not they are 
informationally encapsulated. To be informationally encapsulated is for our emotion generation systems 
to be insensitive to top-down influence, e.g. from propositional knowledge already possessed by the 
agent. Emotions can bias certain pieces of  information whilst being insensitive in this way. This is 
confirmed by multi-pathway models of  emotion generation at the neurobiological level. Emotional 
responses, especially fear responses, can be triggered by stimuli “off-line” without activating the cortex, 
and thereby without the agent being consciously aware of  the stimuli. Such emotion processing is said 
to occur without any top-down influence from the agent’s beliefs. To the extent that such emotions 
have an evaluative component, they can bias certain response-options over others. However, emotional 
responses, like those involved in fear, can also be triggered “on-line”, and in a way that is susceptible to 
top-down influence. Such emotional responses result from neural circuits that activate the cortex, 
consciously register the stimuli, and are influenced by background information possessed by the agent.  6
Emotions triggered in this way, to the extent that they have an evaluative component, can also 
successfully bias certain response options over others. 
 In summary, a careful examination of  the possible factors which give rise to the philosophers’ 
frame problem, as well as de Sousa’s proposed response to it, puts emotional salience at the heart of  
how emotions solve this problem. Emotions assist reasoning, and ergo make their bearers rational, 
insofar as they determine patterns of  salience. But what’s more, we now see that we can provide an 
explanation of  how emotions determine salience in virtue their very nature sans any further claims 
about emotion processing being informationally encapsulated. This makes the hypothesis under 
investigation — “the role of  emotions is to supply the insufficiency of  reason by imitating the 
encapsulation of  perceptual modes” (de Sousa 1987: 195) — mysterious. Precisely what is it that the 
temporary encapsulation of  emotions contributes to how they determine the salience of  features of  
perception and reasoning, and thereby assist reasoning? 
3.   The Role of  Information Encapsulation in Emotion-Driven Reasoning 
 The evaluative nature of  emotions is discussed by Solomon (1976), de Sousa (1987), Greenspan (1988), 5
amongst others.
 This is proposed by several multi-level theories of  emotion generation, and confirmed for fear generation at 6
the neurobiological level by LeDoux (1996).
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3.1  Efficiency of  Response-Options Selections 
As I see it, there are two major ways the information encapsulation of  emotion processing contributes 
to emotion-driven reasoning. In neither way does information encapsulation determine the salience of  
features of  perception and reasoning. Instead, encapsulation makes a contribution to how such salience 
is determined, and in a way that is conducive to how emotions help solve the philosophers’ frame 
problem. In the first instance, encapsulation helps emotions determine the salience of  information in 
an efficient manner. There are two facets to how it does so, one of  which concerns speed, and the 
other cognitive cost. 
 The need for speed speaks directly to the philosophers’ frame problem construed as one having 
a time constraint, i.e. we assume the problem comes with Hamlet’s problem built in. One benefit of  a 
system being informationally encapsulated, and thereby ignoring background information, is we can 
focus and process in-coming information in a quick and efficient manner. As Fodor notes, “speed is 
purchased for input systems by permitting them to ignore lots of  facts” (1987: 70). It might, therefore, 
be assumed that emotional processing being informationally encapsulated is required to solve this 
particular version of  the frame problem.  
 It is plausible that encapsulation is required to solve the frame problem under certain time-
constraints. Seeing a snake on a hike-trail or wearing off  the path of  an oncoming car, for example, are 
cases where an emotional response trigged bottom-up would be beneficial, and precisely for 
guaranteeing the speed of  an appropriate response. But top-down effects can also be quick, and it isn't 
clear whether all instances of  Hamlet’s problem, or even most, require emotion processing to be 
encapsulated. Take Dennett’s example. It is hard to see why it would be essential for the robot’s system 
to be encapsulated for it to escape the ticking bomb. The processing that generates its response-options 
might be susceptible to top-down influence, but it may still select a response-option within the required 
time. (In fact, it is highly likely that the selection of  an optimal response-option in this situation 
requires top-down influence, as the robot will need to recall its knowledge of  possible escape routes, its 
knowledge that bombs are hard to diffuse etc.). Not all instances of  the frame problem, even when 
they arise with significant time-constraints, then, seem to require the super quick reflex-like response-
options that can only be triggered by emotional responses being encapsulated.  
 The take home message shouldn’t be that the speed at which response-options are selected is 
unimportant, nor that encapsulation doesn't matter for these purposes. Rather, the point is 
encapsulation does make us select response options quickly, but the specific speeds at which only it can 
help us do so is only necessary in a limited range of  instances — even within the subset of  frame 
problems seen through the lenses of  Hamlet’s problem. 
 While the facet of  speed only matters in a limited range of  instances, the contribution 
encapsulation makes to minimising cognitive costs plausibly applies to all instances of  the philosophers’ 
frame problem. For any given instance where there is a range of  response-options to choose from, 
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background information may bear on selecting the best possible options, and in a timely fashion 
required by the specific instances. Nevertheless, were it possible to select the relevant options without 
considering such information, we can resolve frame problems without the cognitive costs acquired 
when we consider such information. A potential benefit of  this is agents are better able to allocate their 
cognitive resources to other tasks, e.g. how to best follow through with the response-options they have 
selected.  
 It is important, however, not to overestimate how much cognitive cost is actually minimised 
when emotional processing is encapsulated. Encapsulated systems are insensitive to information stored 
in other channels. When perceptual processing is encapsulated, for example, this is taken to mean 
background information, e.g. what the agent believes, does not influence what we perceive. By contrast, 
when this process is claimed to be “cognitively penetrated”, the claim is not that what the agent actively 
considers affects what they perceive; though it very well might. Instead, the claim is the agent’s beliefs 
affect their perception regardless of  whether they actively consider these beliefs. In this way, any 
cognitive costs to the agent that are spared on account of  emotion processing being encapsulated 
needn't involve anything resembling deliberation, or even any conscious activity for that matter. 
Subsequently, emotion-driven reasoning, when emotion processing is encapsulated, no way ensures any 
significant gains when it comes to the minimisation of  cognitive costs.  
 Both facets discussed above play a role in how emotions determine the salience of  features of  
information, though the role they play is minimal and in most cases inessential. The next way 
encapsulation of  emotion processing contributes to emotion-driven reasoning will prove far more 
crucial. This can be brought out in the context of  why information encapsulation was thought relevant 
for the original frame problem(s) in artificial intelligence, and why it fails to play the same role when it 
comes to the philosophers’ frame problem. 
3.2  Maintaining Response-Option Selections 
The first discussion of  how information encapsulation bears on the frame problem was discussed by 
Fodor (1983, 1987, 2000). In his discussion, Fodor argues that frame problems don't arise for 
informationally encapsulated systems because there is only a small amount of  information over which 
to compute. Chow provides the following exposition:  
To be more precise, encapsulated systems avoid relevance problems in two subtly distinct ways: Not 
only does the small amount of  information contained in the system’s database constitute all the 
information that the system can consider, thus considerably reducing the number of  computations 
needed for information search, but that small amount of  information constitutes the one and only set 
of  background information against which relevance is determined. The more encapsulated a system is, 
the more tractable its computations will be, and the less relevance problems will be problems. (2013: 
315-316) 
!8
Chow here is discussing one version of  the frame problem, which he calls the ‘Generalised Relevance 
Problem’: “how a cognitive system can make determinations of  what is relevant to a given task with 
reasonable levels of  success” (pg. 313). Since informationally encapsulated systems are insensitive to 
propositional knowledge the agent already knows, such systems significantly restrict the amount of  
information that can bear on a response-option. Fodor argues that systems like perceptual processing 
are encapsulated, but he also argues that central cognition isn't given its holistic nature. The upshot of  
this is that frame problems still arise for computations to be carried out by central cognition.  
 In this context, it is not far-fetched to suppose de Sousa’s proposal is a way of  explaining how 
we can solve the frame problem faced by processing at the level of  central cognition. Emotions 
“mimic” the encapsulation of  perception, and ergo restrict the amount of  information over which to 
make computations at this level. We find an exposition compatible with this picture when we closely 
examine what de Sousa supposes is achieved by the encapsulation of  emotion processing:  
[A]n emotion limits the range of  information that the organism will take into account, the inferences 
actually drawn from a potential infinity, and the set of  live options among which it will choose. (de 
Sousa 1987: 195) 
If  we take the inspiration for this to be Fodor’s suggested proposal as to how we solve the frame 
problem, a plausible interpretation has it that the temporary information encapsulation of  emotions 
don't really solve the problem for central cognition as much as prevents the problem from arising 
despite its usual holistic nature. There are, however, two major worries with this proposal. First, it 
remains unclear how the Fodor-inspired move actually addresses the frame problem understood as a 
problem of  not just restricting information, but restricting it to that which is relevant to achieve 
reasonable levels of  success when it comes to choosing response-options.  
 This worry is accounted for given the overall framework de Sousa proposes. Emotions bias 
certain pieces of  information, and they acquire the biases they do have for a variety of  cultural and 
biological reasons. de Sousa’s exposition employs the notion of  “paradigm scenarios” where we first 
acquire our knowledge of  which emotional responses are appropriate for a given situation. The 
appropriateness of  future emotional responses are measured against the backdrop of  the responses 
acquired during these scenarios. The details don’t really matter for current purposes. What does is the 
availability of  plausible developmental stories which explain why we acquire our emotional biases. 
These suffice to explain why our biases confer salience to information relevant to achieving reasonable 
levels of  success. In brief, both cultural and biological evolution selects for emotional biases that, on 
the whole, achieve reasonable levels of  success. Once again how the philosophers’ frame problem is 
resolved, then, is explained without the need to make any commitments to emotion processing being 
informationally encapsulated. 
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 The second worry, like the first, concerns a lack of  success when we apply the Fodorian move 
to the philosophers’ frame problem. The crucial feature of  an encapsulated system, de Sousa notes, is it 
“limits the range of  information that the organism will take into account” (pg. 195). This is ambiguous 
as to whether the information limited is background information or in-coming information. 
Informationally encapsulated systems successfully limit background information. To be an encapsulated 
information processing system is simply to be insensitive to background information — except for any 
information stored within that very system. Consequently, there is no question of  whether they limit 
background information. Informationally encapsulated systems, however, do not limit in-coming 
information. This is significant because insofar as solving the philosophers’ frame problem also 
requires limiting in-coming information, the information encapsulation of  emotion processing will not 
fully resolve this problem.  
 To elaborate, as we noted earlier, the frame problem in its broadest form is a problem about 
how to restrict the amount of  information that is to be computed for us to get an appropriate 
response-option. This understanding of  the problem gives way to three possible interpretations: we 
need to restrict (i) background information, (ii) in-coming information, or (iii) both. Fodor’s discussion 
of  the frame problem assumes (i), whereas prevailing discussions of  the philosophers’ frame problem, 
including de Sousa’s own, centres on (iii). The inclusion of  (ii) is perhaps clearest in Faucher and 
Tappolet’s exposition of  de Sousa’s proposal where they write, it “is natural to think that emotions 
influence what we attend to and determine what information we take in” (2002: 108). Quite 
independent of  de Sousa, the function of  emotion, construed as a mechanism that biases in-coming 
perceptual information, is discussed within the context of  both evolutionary psychology and 
neuroscience. For evolutionary psychologists Ketelaar and Todd, “specific emotions might help to solve 
the problem of  what information to attend to in specific environmental circumstances” (2001: 194). 
Likewise, for neuroscientist Panskepp, emotions help “modulate attentional and sensory-motor 
sensitivities relevant for the evolved behavioural tendencies” (2000: 22). Faucher and Tappolet 
themselves argue the thesis that emotions bias perceptual data is empirically borne out, at least with 
regards to the emotion of  fear and anxiety. 
 Assuming another way emotions assist reasoning is by limiting in-coming information, we face 
similar problems when we try to find a role for how information encapsulation of  emotion processing 
helps with this task as we do when we try to determine the precise role it plays in assisting reasoning 
when it limits background information. Informationally encapsulated systems don't restrict in-coming 
information. They are neither insensitive to certain kinds of  in-coming information, nor do they mark 
certain pieces of  such information as more salient than others. As before, how emotions determine the 
salience of  information, in this case in-coming information, can be explained in terms of  their affective 
component. Emotions bias certain in-coming information over others because they have an affect 
component, which helps evaluate certain pieces of  information as being positive or negative. Moreover, 
emotions acquire the biases they do have for a variety of  cultural and biological reasons. A story of  
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how emotions determine the salience of  features of  perception can, therefore, be told sans any 
commitment to emotion processing being encapsulated.  
 To recap, a focus on information encapsulation within the context of  the philosophers’ frame 
problem, I suggest, stems from the role Fodor attributes to it with regards to the frame problem in 
artificial intelligence. The two problems discussed above, however, demonstrate how information 
encapsulation of  emotion processing cannot resolve the philosophers’ frame problem. The 
encapsulation of  emotion processing fails to resolve this problem because it does not determine the 
salience of  information — be it in-coming information or the relevant background information. We 
then reach a negative verdict. Nevertheless, putting aside the role Fodor attributes to encapsulated 
systems helps us see an alternative way encapsulation of  emotion processing might be relevant for the 
philosophers’ frame problem. Emotional processing, on occasions it is encapsulated, doesn't determine 
our emotion-driven biases, but rather ensures these biases are not overridden.  
 We have predetermined biases which emotions seek to highlight in virtue of  their affective 
components. Provided our emotional responses, and their ensuing biases, are triggered without 
considering background information, this ensures these biases are manifested in a way that isn't 
overridden by what the agent knows or believes. For instance, there might be various evolutionary or 
sociological reasons why our fear responses are more acute for unrecognised noises, especially when 
they are coming from the periphery, or other cases of  visual disintegration, say walking in a dark 
alleyway. These responses seek to highlight such noises over other perceptual data, e.g. the beautiful 
reflection of  yellow light from a streetlamp on the wet pavement. Moreover, they do so regardless of  
what the agent believes. An aesthete might have certain beliefs about the good life being one where she 
appreciates beauty wherever possible. These beliefs may, in practice, result in tendencies to prioritise 
perceptual data which lead to aesthetic experiences. Nevertheless, her fear responses, where they are 
informationally encapsulated, ensure these responses, and the ensuing biasing of  unrecognised auditory 
data, are not not overridden by her aesthetic beliefs and belief-based tendencies. She may live her life 
religiously practising her appreciation of  beauty, but her fear responses ensure she prioritises potential 
sources of  danger when considering response-options, e.g. when walking in a dark alleyway.  
 Information encapsulation of  emotion processing plays the same role when it comes to 
restricting non-perceptual information. Emotions bias certain inferential patterns over others. 
Moreover, emotion processing being encapsulated ensures these biases are not overridden. The 
aesthetic, for instance, might be prone to contemplating the beautiful, even when walking in dark 
alleyways by herself. But the information encapsulation of  the mechanisms that trigger her fear 
responses ensure these responses are triggered by unrecognised noises, regardless of  her intentions. 
Moreover, these responses in turn prioritise inferences concerning the selection of  response-options to 
threat over the sorts of  inferences involved in contemplating the beautiful. 
 The claim here isn't that there can’t be any top-down effects of  cognition on emotion 
processing. Through training, various beliefs might come to penetrate such processing, especially 
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diachronically. Cognitive behavioural therapy might, for example, be employed to dull our fear 
responses to walking in dimly lit streets.  However, where emotion processing “mimics” the 7
encapsulation of  perceptual processing, emotions can continue their role of  acting as biasing 
mechanisms which seek to prioritise certain pieces of  information over others. In other words, the 
information encapsulation of  emotion processing guarantees these biases are not overridden by what 
the agent believes. Encapsulation doesn’t, then, determine the salience that emotions confer 
information, but rather turns out to be necessary for guaranteeing that emotions can fulfil this role of  
determining salience.  
4.   The Role of  Information Encapsulation in Hindering Reasoning 
Emotions assist reasoning by acting as a biasing mechanism that biases certain features of  perception 
and reasoning over others. This very function of  emotion can also explain the way emotions sometimes 
hinder reasoning and thereby make their bearers irrational. As before, the major contribution emotions 
make to issues to do with rationality, in this case irrationality, can be explained without any 
commitments to their information encapsulation. Instead, informationally encapsulated emotion 
processing provides a possible mechanism by which such cases of  emotional irrationality are brought 
about. 
 It bears noting here that there are a plurality of  emotional phenomena discussed under the 
“irrational emotions” banner. Information encapsulation has consequences for at least two of  them. 
First, emotions are deemed irrational when they clash with the subject’s considered judgements. These 
emotions, also dubbed “recalcitrant emotions”, are irrational from the subject’s own perspective.  For 8
instance, to borrow from Greenspan (1981), you fear Fido, your neighbours’ dog you judge to be 
harmless. What is salient in this case isn’t whether Fido is actually dangerous but that you fear him 
despite judging that he isn’t. The information encapsulation of  emotion processing goes a long way to 
explaining how such emotions come about. A fear of  dogs might have been acquired during certain 
paradigm scenarios. Provided fear responses triggered by dogs are immune to top-down influence from 
cognitive states like judgement, a fear of  Fido will persist despite the judgement that he is harmless. 
 A view like this is suggested by Griffiths (1990, 1997) when he seeks to explain what he calls 
“irrational emotions”. In brief, he argues such emotions can be explained by modular emotion 
generation systems that can give rise to emotional responses sans the cognitive processes that lead to 
judgement. In such a case, you will fear Fido despite not making the judgement that he is harmless. 
This is not strictly an explanation of  recalcitrant emotions, as here we have an emotion in the absence 
 A subject might undergo such therapy if  trauma has induced debilitating fear responses to walking 7
unaccompanied in dark streets.
 For a discussion of  recalcitrant emotions, see Greenspan (1981), Helm (2001), and D’Arms and Jacobson 8
(2003).
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of  the relevant judgement, as opposed to an emotion with clashes with a judgement. But such a case 
might also be classified as irrational under certain liberal notions of  emotional irrationality. 
 It is important to note that in both instances, a story of  why these emotions are irrational can 
be told without any claims about information encapsulation. In genuine recalcitrant cases, what does 
the work of  explaining why recalcitrant emotions are irrational has to do with the conflict between 
emotion and judgement, as opposed to anything to do with informational encapsulation as such. 
Likewise, in the case of  groundless emotions, why these emotions are irrational has to do with the very 
fact that they are, at least from the subject’s perspective, groundless. Nevertheless, as we saw, 
encapsulation of  emotion processing explains how such emotional episodes come about.  
 Information encapsulation also bears on possible explanations of  irrational emotions, as 
conceived from viewpoints that outstrip the subject’s own perspective. Under de Sousa’s teleological 
conception of  rationality, emotions are rational when they fulfil their biological function, i.e. determine 
the salience of  features perception and reasoning. It is tempting, on this basis, to assume emotions are 
irrational when they inhibit this function. Such an account, however, most plausibly speaks to how 
emotions can be arational as opposed to irrational. This is clear when we focus on the philosophers’ 
frame problem. Emotions help solve this problem by assisting reasoning by drawing our attention to 
some information over others. If  emotions were to simply fail to draw our attention in this way, the 
frame problem remains unresolved, but not in any way in which the problem is worsened. A lack of  
attentional biases doesn’t ‘distort’ reasoning. Rather, it simply leaves reasoning as it were. 
 A second, better, way of  understanding of  emotional irrationality under the teleological 
conception of  rationality is to draw on the purpose of  our biological functions. These functions tend 
to be geared towards achieving certain goals, the central one presumably being to maintain the survival 
of  the organism, if  not the species. Once we factor this into the equation, the whole point of  emotions 
fulfilling their biological function is to ensure certain further goals are met, e.g. goals to do with 
survival. This picture lends itself  to a different way emotions might turn out to be irrational. Emotions 
are irrational when they disrupt reasoning. Moreover, they do so when they limit the set of  perceptual 
cues and live response-options to ones that are suboptimal or detrimental to the organism. For 
example, a phobia of  spiders will turn out to be irrational when it focusses an agent’s attention on 
spider-related information at the expense of  neglecting information that is more conducive to 
achieving their goals. 
 The teleological notion of  emotional irrationality, like the ones mentioned earlier, can be made 
sense of  without any commitment to emotion processing being informationally encapsulated. But also 
like before, encapsulation provides an explanation of  how such irrational episodes are possible. We 
might acquire emotional responses to certain situations during paradigm scenarios that are actually 
detrimental to our long-term goals. For instance, certain environmental factors, such as parenting, 
might make a subject react overly jealous to any scenario that has the slightest potential for infidelity. 
Provided the emotion processing that triggers these bouts of  jealousy are encapsulated, the subject will 
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be unable to override them, even if  they cause significant psychological distress and impedes their 
ability to form anything resembling a meaningful relationship. These episodes of  jealousy are irrational 
because they conflict with the agent’s long-term goals, but they are possible, and persist, because the 
mechanisms that generate them are informationally encapsulated.  
 Overall, what is striking here is that it is the very feature that explains precisely how emotions 
assist reasoning, which also explains how they, on occasion, hinder reasoning. That is, information 
encapsulation provides the mechanisms by which emotions can contribute to our rationality, but it is 
these very mechanisms that also explains how they sometimes make us irrational. Crucially, there is no 
tension between the two stories. 
5.  Conclusion.  
This paper concerned itself  with what cognitive architecture could tell us about emotion-driven 
reasoning. To that end, we assessed a hypothesis about a particular feature of  such architecture owing 
to de Sousa: “the role of  emotions is to supply the insufficiency of  reason by imitating the 
encapsulation of  perceptual modes” (1987: 195). We now find this interpretation to be misleading. The 
central role of  emotion in emotion-lead reasoning isn't to mimic the information encapsulation of  
perception but to determine the salience of  information; something it can do without being 
informationally encapsulated. However, we also see there is a sense in which de Sousa was on the right 
track. Emotions do “control” the salience of  features of  perception and reasoning. The positive parts 
of  this paper fleshed out precisely how this is so. The encapsulation of  emotion processing ensures 
emotions can fulfil their central role in an efficient manner, and in a way that isn’t overridden by what 
the agent knows. The price we pay for these benefits, we saw, is emotional processing can sometimes 
lead to us being irrational, i.e. on occasions when emotions determine the salience of  information in a 
way that conflicts with our considered judgement or is detrimental to our long-term goals. 
 If  the above account of  how emotions contribute to reasoning is correct, analyses of  emotional 
rationality can proceed without any presuppositions about cognitive architecture. That is, we can, at a 
level of  abstraction, explain how emotions assist reasoning without making any commitment to 
emotion processing being informationally encapsulated. Nevertheless, if  we are serious about providing 
a detailed story as to precisely how emotions assist reasoning, including an account of  the mechanisms 
by which it does so, information encapsulation will be part of  the parcel of  such a story. How 
philosophically pressing knowing about cognitive architecture is to the endeavour of  explaining 
emotional rationality will, then, depend on just how deep you want your theory to go. 
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